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The Theory of Positive Self-Reference  
 
Human beings construct meaning. We use meaning and complexes of meaning to 
understand ourselves, each other, and the world around us. We can coordinate our 
expectations, beliefs, and actions socially when we share meaning or a complex 
structure of meaning, e.g. a world-view, paradigm, theory, an interpretation, or a 
proposition. When everybody in a given population shares an interpretation we call it 
culture. Meaningfulness is a pragmatic condition not only for sharing an 
intersubjective understanding, but also for motivating collective action. In order to 
have socially robust norms and knowledge we must not only share meaning, it must 
also be meaningful and valid somehow in order to be useful. Philosophy has taught 
us that we in principle can justify and validate by establishing an introspective or 
intuitive relation to our own thoughts, by establishing a relation to objects in the 
world, or by establishing a linguistic relation to other linguistic constructs of meaning. 
In a pragmatic perspective all explicit justification is justifying a proposition by other 
propositions, etc. (Rorty 1979:159). In a linguistic-pragmatic perspective all 
references are made in the form of a proposition stating the existence of such a 
relationship, which accordingly may exist or not, be true or not, or be useful or not, 
depending on which kind of rationality test we apply. Making such a reference explicit 
is making it socially accessible. Making it explicit is establishing a meaningful 
reference or inference. Making it socially accessible presupposes shared meaning.  
     We have as human beings the ability to refer to a range of things including our 
thoughts, each other, symbols, concepts, constructs of meanings, and objects. 
Without the ability to make references our world as we know it would collapse. 
Lacking the ability to refer, we would e.g. have a problem of interpreting, 
remembering, and conceptualizing the world. In fact, the ability to refer is a 
presupposition of our having a directed consciousness and a language. The 
phenomenon of referring is fundamental to subjective thought processes and 
intersubjective communication. The ability to establish a reference precedes the 
ability to share it as more or less semantically fixed. When we reflect on linguistic 
behavior in language a kind of pragmatic self-reference is established, this is 
because we cannot escape the medium, but are always already situated within it. 
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When we reflect on our reflections the self-reference is obvious, because we are self-
conscious or self-aware. When reflecting explicitly on linguistic behavior we are often 
caught in a linguistic self-reference. An example of this is my two year-old nephew, 
who asked: “Why do I keep asking questions?”.  Because the ability to refer is so 
fundamental and is very closely connected to the use of language, we may 
sometimes establish relationships of self-reference because linguistic expressions 
may directly or indirectly refer to themselves. When we reflect we relate our thoughts 
to our thoughts. When we use sentences we may use reflexivity by establishing a 
relationship to the sentences themselves. This is possible because a sentence may 
refer or point to other things, but also to itself. When we think about thinking or make 
statements about statements we are thrown into a universe of self-reference. When 
we communicate about communication we establish a pragmatic self-reference we 
cannot easily escape. In fact, the phenomena of reflexivity and self-reference is all-
pervasive and is not only of relevance to philosophers or logicians, but has practical 
implication everywhere where people reflect on or reflexively justify what they expect, 
believe, think, say, and do. Reflexivity and the figure of self-reference permeate our 
lives, intellectually as well as practically.   
     In this theory of positive self-reference I will present a view on self-reference 
slightly different from those we are traditionally familiar with. The change of 
perspective to analyzing constructs of meaning involving self-reference opens up a 
new perspective on self-reference. The new perspective demonstrates that self-
reference can be positive, and in a pragmatic perspective, productive. The traditional 
claim that all self-references are invalid, vicious, and therefore by definition either 
indeterminable or false is challenged by the demonstration of the existence of 
positive self-reference. The theory falsifies the basic idea in mathematics that all self-
references are problematic or false, and accordingly should be banned as syntactical 
and semantic constructs of meaning. Furthermore, self-reference in constructs of 
meaning can be tested through a kind of reflexivity test as to whether they are 
positive and potentially valid, or are negative self-references and therefore not valid. 
Thus the question of validity is not given up despite the devastating critique of the 
traditional understanding of the nature of self-reference in logic and mathematics.  
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     What I am trying to develop is not just another formal theory only meaningful to 
logicians, but a general theory with extended pragmatic applicability. The reality is 
that reflexivity has come to stay, and penetrates all fields of research and very often 
also praxis existing outside of universities. Everywhere we encounter constructs of 
meaning involving paradoxes or reflexivity, we are confronted with the figure of the 
self-reference. It is most often too difficult to understand because we have no 
workable theory to guide our understanding. No theory has yet, to my knowledge, 
been successfully developed with the aim of being a tool assisting in the judgement 
of the validity of such reflexive constructions of meaning. We cannot any longer just 
ban self-reference, because the need for reflexive knowledge and reflexive 
justification is real, and cannot be ignored. Banning all self-reference implies banning 
all the positive and useful aspects of reflexivity as well. It is like throwing the baby out 
with the bath water. The aim of the theory of positive self-reference is to provide an 
understanding of self-reference which also involves the pragmatic aspects of the 
complicated relationships we refer to when constructing meaning involving self-
reference. In taking the perspective of constructs of meaning I can demonstrate 
reflexively how we can handle self-reference pragmatically, without losing the power 
of reflexivity, which is more and more demanded in a world where knowledge plays 
an increasingly important role.   
 
 
The Problem of Contradiction 
 
Logic is generally understood as explicating the structure and principles of reasoning 
or of sound arguments. George Boole and other logicians even understood logic as 
investigating the rules of the human intellect, captured in the phrase “the laws of 
thought”. It has always been the force of logic to free conceptual thinking and arguing 
from contradiction. The authority of logic is that it relies on the dictate of reason to 
avoid contradiction and make valid inferences. If there is anything rational people and 
logicians can agree on it is the law of non-contradiction, that contradictions are false 
and unacceptable to reason.  
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     Aristotle defined and understood the principle of contradiction as the most certain 
of all; “it is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to 
the same subject in the same respect” (Aristotle 1984:1005b19). Accordingly it is 
impossible for anyone to believe the same thing to be and not to be. Since Aristotle 
we formalize the contradiction as any statement which can be reduced to the format: 
“S is P and S is non-P”, where S is the subject we say something about in a 
sentence, and P is what we say about it by ascribing a predicate or a property. 
Aristotle said: “A contradiction is an opposition of which itself excludes any 
intermediate; and the part of a contradiction saying something of something is an 
affirmation, the one saying something from something is a denial” (Aristotle 
1984:72a12). If one part in the sentence affirming and denying the same property is 
determined true it is demonstrative. It is dialectical if it assumes indifferently either 
part as potentially valid. Dialectic is also a mode of examination (Aristotle 
1984:172a22). Understood in terms of a dialogue, an argument between two persons 
is dialectical and an ongoing process, until one person can demonstrate that either S 
is P or S is non-P. We basically cannot accept a description being contradictory, and 
no rational persons can legitimately agree on a contradiction. To Aristotle a 
demonstration is deductively proved or justified through a middle term, which 
established a necessary relationship between the premises and the conclusion. This 
relationship is necessary and has to be the case – “even if the answerer denies it” 
(Aristotle 1984:91b17). Thus valid arguments can change the dialectic into a 
demonstration, with the force of necessity. Jürgen Habermas is poetic and humorous 
about the difference between the dictates of reason and the dictates of power 
exercised by other persons, when he talks about discourses being led by “the 
unforced force of the better argument” (Habermas 1993:23,163). Reasoned 
arguments do not use power as a force, but force rational people by demonstrating 
necessity to reason. This constitutes a peculiar self-reference, since only rational and 
reasonable persons are submitted to or dictated by reason. There is no empirical 
necessity in being reasonable and dictated by reason, just an evolutionary option 
mankind in general has adopted as an ability to learn from, and justify beliefs with 
arguments. This is why it is often assumed by definition that rational autonomous 
people are guided by reason. 
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     There are many arguments why our subjective set of beliefs and our 
intersubjective agreement need to be free of contradiction. The necessary lack of any 
intermediate or any logical middle term Aristotle talks about makes the case. 
Contradictions are inconsistent and incoherent.  
     Contradictions are syntactically impossible because they are not understandable 
and well-formed propositions, and we have no means of clarifying what to 
understand if a claim assumes the format  “S is P and S is not P”. They are 
semantically problematic because we do not know what predicate or property to refer 
to since it is both affirmed and denied at the same time (Aristotle 1984:1062a8-24). 
Contradictions are pragmatically inapt because we can not know what obligation the 
speaker is assuming.  
 
As Karl Popper has pointed out, a self-contradictory system must be rejected for 
cognitive reasons because it is false. It is false because it is necessarily 
uninformative, because any conclusion we please can be derived from it (Popper 
1959:92). A self-contradictory system simply does not discriminate anything. Since 
we are seeking relevant distinctions, contradictions do not apply. Another cognitive 
reason why contradictions are to be avoided is that they cannot justify beliefs, and 
therefore cannot be knowledge.  
     In a normative context, contradictions cannot function prescriptively as a guide to 
actions, because the actions of an addressee are unpredictable and can never be 
consistently carried out. The addressee could, with the same probability and 
sincerity, do the opposite of what the norm commands. The normative reason is that 
a contradiction makes a norm functionally inapplicable because it cannot stabilize 
mutual expectations to one’s own and others’ actions, but produces an 
indeterminability of meaning and accordingly a situation characterized by double 
contingency. Double contingency is to be understood as a situation where no-one 
knows what to expect of the other, because each party makes the expectations 
mutually dependent one the unknown expectations of the other (Luhmann 1995:107). 
Double contingency entails indeterminability of expectations. 
     The pragmatic reason for avoiding contradictions is that they cannot be mediated 
unambiguously and reproduced consistently by the next generations of addressees. 
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Pragmatically, contradictions lead to an undermining of trust, because one with good 
grounds cannot trust an obligation or a promise which is formulated in contradiction, 
because the promise functionally dissolves itself. The sentence: "I promise you to 
pay back the money and I promise you not to pay back the money," through the 
power of the semantic contradiction alone dissolves possible trust. A promise 
containing an indirect pragmatic contradiction such as: "I promise you to personally 
bring you the money today, and I have decided not to leave my bed today" dissolves 
trust due to the inherent contradiction. Concerning contradiction in the relationship to 
mutual stabilizing of expectations, even Niklas Luhmann seems to agree with this 
when he says: “Contradictions destabilize a system, and they reveal this in the 
insecurity of expectation" (Luhmann 1995:367). If a promise and trust are based on 
having reasonable grounds for expecting that the speaker is obliged to his promise, 
then contradicting statements can never be a promise. Founding a promise on a 
contradiction is as absurd and self-refuting as saying: “I promise you not to keep this 
promise”.  
 
Contradictory theories can neither produce valid interpretations or accompanying 
unambiguous descriptions. These are the reasons why one of the most powerful 
arguments against a theory is to demonstrate, by immanent critique, that the theory 
entails or presupposes a contradiction. Contradictions can be direct with the form “S 
is P and S is non-P” or they can be indirect. To the class of indirect contradictions 
belong contradictions which arise in relationship to self-references. Paradoxes and 
performative contradictions belong to the class of indirect contradiction.  
 
 
The Classical Ban on Self-Reference 
 
In theoretical philosophy, analytical philosophy, and among logicians and 
mathematicians, it is still a generally accepted view that self-reference is invalid, and 
accordingly something to be avoided. The background for this is to be found in the 
existence of paradoxes, and the consensus among leading logicians in the 1900’s 
that self-reference was to blame for the paradoxes, because self-reference, in 
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general, contained a vicious circularity (Ormell 1993:2). The result of this has been a 
general ban on self-reference and an accompanying taboo on looking into the 
justification and validity of such a ban. This is nevertheless what I am doing by 
pointing out the existence of positive self-reference. 
     Some of the first and most famous paradoxes can be traced back to Zeno and 
Epimenides. Zeno is famous for his four paradoxes including the paradox of Achilles 
and the tortoise. He argues that if the tortoise to begin with gets a head start, Achilles 
will never win the race. This is because during the time it takes Achilles to reach the 
point the tortoise was at, the tortoise will have moved forward, etc., etc. The 
conclusion is that Achilles will never pass the tortoise, and accordingly cannot win the 
race. This paradox has been resolved by developing a mathematical way of handling 
infinitely small numbers. 
     Epimenides is usually remembered for the Liar Paradox. Epimenides created a 
pragmatic paradox because he was from Crete, and said, “All Cretans are lying”. This 
can be reconstructed as a semantic paradox by the sentences “What I am now 
saying is false,” or “I am lying”. It might be seen as a simple trick with words, but it 
has, like all paradoxes, this peculiar property of being impossible to attribute a truth-
value. If he is telling the truth, then he is consequently lying. And if he is lying, he is 
consequently telling the truth.  
     Plato presents us with several paradoxes. The problem of self-reference leading 
to paradoxes obviously occurs when we talk of self-knowledge, or of the relationship 
between second order meta-knowledge and first order object-knowledge. This is 
interesting since many researchers have tried to dissolve paradoxes by transcribing 
them qua distinguishing between first order and second order language, or object-
language and meta-language. In the dialogue Charmides, Plato wrote:  
 
”Then the wise or temperate man, and he only, will know himself, and be able 
to examine what he knows or does not know, and to see what others know 
and think that they know and do really know, and what they do not know and 
fancy that they know when they do not. No other person will be able to do this. 
And this is wisdom and temperance and self-knowledge – for man to know 
what he knows, and what he does not know” (Plato 1980:167a).  
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Plato’s argument demonstrates the absurdity of second order observation of 
constructs of meaning. After establishing that self-knowledge is a second order 
knowledge of our knowledge and non-knowledge, Plato points out that a science built 
on that model would be “a single science which is wholly a science of itself and of 
other sciences, and at the same time a science of the absence of science” (Plato 
1980:167b).  Plato finds such a construction absurd and uses arguments by analogy 
to show that such a construction is not only monstrous, but in fact impossible.   
     Furthermore, Socrates rhetorically asks in a hypothetical mode: ”Suppose there is 
a kind of vision which is not like ordinary vision, but a vision of itself and of other sorts 
of vision, and of the defects of them, which in seeing sees no color, but only itself and 
other sorts of vision” (Plato 1980:167b). Socrates continues by asking: Or is there a 
kind of hearing which hears no sound at all, but only itself and other sorts or hearing, 
or the defects of them? (Plato 1980:167d). And he continued the argument by 
analogy with: ”Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure, but 
of itself and all other desires? (Plato 1980:167e). The argument continues with 
examples of a sense sensing itself and other senses, a desire of itself, a wish of 
itself, a love of itself, a fear of itself, and an opinion of itself. From these analogies 
Socrates concludes the argument by expressing that, “it seems we are assuming a 
science of this kind, which having no subject matter, is a science of itself and of other 
sciences” (Plato 1980:168b). From Plato’s arguments it seems that making the self-
reference into a second order reference by distinguishing first-order object-language 
and second order meta-language does not solve the problem of bad and impossible 
constructs of self-reference. Second order observations and second order reflections 
seem to loose their object and run into a contradiction that observations must be able 
to observe themselves and reflections must be able to reflect themselves as well.  
     Aristotle was the founder of formal logic. Aristotle was also equating paradox with 
impossibility (Aristotle 1984:159a21). Paradoxes were to be avoided, and to show 
that an opponent was stating something paradoxical was a way of refuting the 
argument as invalid. In Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle outlined five strategies 
applicable to those arguing as competitors or rivals. “These are five in number: 
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refutation, falsity, paradox, solecism1, and fifthly to reduce the opponent in the 
discussion to babbling (i.e. to constrain him to repeat himself a number of times); or it 
is to produce the appearance of each of these things without reality” (Aristotle 
1984:165b16). The founder of classical logic understood that paradoxes lead to 
contradiction, and accordingly could never state anything true.  
     Until 1901 paradoxes were mainly puzzles for philosophers and other people who 
liked playing with words. Someone saying “I am lying” has really no impact on a 
normal man, who might merely say “so what – go away!”.  
     Paradoxes became real theoretical problems with a practical importance due to 
the attempt to give mathematics a logical foundation. It was the concept of sets 
introduced by George Boole, Julius Wilhelm Richard Dedekind, Gottlob Frege, and 
George Cantor, which caused the problem. Cantor in his study on infinity worked with 
the concepts “the set of everything” and “the set of all sets”. Cantor gave up on this 
idea, because such a set must include itself as a set of it’s own sub-sets. This, 
Cantor saw as involving a contradiction and stopped his project.  
      In 1901, Bertrand Russell discovered his famous paradox known as Russell’s 
Paradox. Russell reconsidered Cantor’s set of all sets in the theory of classes and 
formulated the paradox in terms of classes. The class of all classes that do not 
belong to themselves – does it belong to itself? Whether we answer yes or no, we 
are led to a contradiction. Russell tried to prove that such a class did not exist, but he 
never succeeded to his own satisfaction. It was not strange to ask whether the totality 
of all ordinary sets would be a member of itself. But the answer kept leading to 
paradox and contradiction. In 1906, Russell invented the theory of types as an 
attempt to solve the problem of self-reference (Russell 1967:155). In 1914, Bertrand 
Russell and Alfred North Whitehead wrote Principia Mathematica where they tried 
with the theory of types to axiomize mathematics in an attempt to eliminate 
paradoxes occurring due to self-reference. But to their surprise, they found that by 
applying the theory of types to mathematics, and thereby removing all self-reference, 
mathematics became unworkable (Winrich 1984:990).  
     To Russell and Whitehead, ”A relation is called reflexive when it holds between a 
term and itself, or whenever it holds between that term and some term” (Grue-
                                                 
1 Solecism, is to make the opponent or answerer, in consequence of the argument, use some barbarous mode of 
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Sørensen 1950:28). ”A class is called reflexive when there is a one-one relation 
which correlates the class with a proper part of itself (A proper part is not the whole)” 
(Grue-Sørensen 1950:45). The definitions of reflexive relations and classes 
demonstrates that Russell and Whitehead accept the meaningful existence of 
reflexivity or self-reference. Principia Mathematica was supposed to give 
mathematics a foundation in logic by developing an axiomatic system, which was 
complete and consistent. In order to do this, Bertrand Russell thought it necessary to 
eliminate all forms of self-reference, both direct and indirect, in order to eliminate 
paradoxes in mathematical language. The means was to develop axiomatic 
principles, which would in effect ban self-reference. In Principia Mathematica they 
invented the doctrine of types, the axiom of choice, the axiom of infinity, and the 
axiom of reducibility to do the job. These principles constituted a ban and a general 
embargo on using self-referential language.  
     Bertrand Russell’s theory of types, Alfred Tarski’s theory of meta-languages, 
Gilbert Ryles’ theory of “namely-riders”, and other attempts were made to prevent the 
occurance of self-referential language (Ormell 1993:14). The enemy was in reality 
paradoxes and contradictions, but self-reference was being fought. In Principia 
Mathematica, Russell and Whitehead effectively ban self-reference by setting up the 
vicious-circle principle stating that “whatever involves all of a collection must not be 
one of the collection” (Russell and Whitehead 1960:37) (Ross 1969:7-8). The 
problem they try to exclude is that it seems legitimate to state something about a 
class. Like “all propositions are either true or false”. But the meaning of ‘all’ seems to 
refer to some already definite collection, which is contradicted if new statements are 
created by statements about ‘all propositions’. Every time we predicate something 
about a class we add new possible meaning to that class. I see this as a possible 
advantage and a necessary condition for collective and explicit learning, but they 
want to rule out the possibility. Ludwig Wittgenstein also expressed a ban of self-
reference in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus when he said: ”No proposition can say 
anything about itself, because the propositional sign cannot be contained in itself 
(that is the ‘whole theory of types')” (Wittgenstein 1958:§3.332). In An Inquiry into 
Meaning and Truth, Russell was still of the opinion that any self-reference where a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
expression (Aristotle 1984:165b20). 
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statement is stating something regarding itself entails a logical contradiction (Russell 
1961). Such a view is also advanced in modern times by Niklas Luhmann, who builds 
and anchors his systems theory on considerations regarding self-reference. Niklas 
Luhmann repeatedly claims that all self-reference leads to paradox or contradiction 
(Luhmann 1990:136, 171) (Luhmann 1989:27) (Luhmann 1995:363). The idea that 
self-reference entails contradiction is a widespread conviction, even though it can be 
shown to be wrong. 
     Paradoxes lead to contradictions when interpreted. Paradoxes leave us in a 
dilemma regarding their truth. In a paradox there is no escape, since we are faced 
with a contradiction no matter what assumption we make about the situation or the 
attributed truth-value. If Epimenides is lying, then he consequently speaks the truth, 
and if he speaks the truth, then consequently he is lying. Why not just hit him hard, 
as one feels like doing after reading Lewis Caroll’s “What the Tortoise Said to 
Achilles”? Here Achilles attempts to argue logically with the tortoise become an 
infinite regression leading to a never-ending discussion (Winch 1973). But such 
drastic means belong to the logic of war, not to the self-understanding of logicians. 
Where the authority of logic is derived from the ability to demonstrate impossibility 
and necessity to reason, prohibiting self-reference changes this force of the better 
argument into a force of a ban against self-reference in general. With this change 
logic takes on the role of a language police seeking out those who make self-
referential and paradoxical statements. Such a ban on self-reference affects the 
credibility of mathematics and of logic itself.  
     It is true that without self-referential language, paradoxes and the entailing 
contradictions do not occur. Banning self-reference is nevertheless an authoritative 
and arbitrary exclusion of other useful properties of self-reference and reflexivity. 
Self-reference is not necessarily epistemologically unproductive, which in itself is an 
argument against dogmatically placing a general prohibition against the use of self-
reference, as Russell does by banning self-reference in his theory of types (Løfgren 
1979:216) (Luhmann 1995:13). The self-reference involved in self-awareness, self-
reflection, self-motivation, self-justification, etc., is not a problem, but a needed and 
valued property in a complex knowledge-based society. To conclude, self-reference 
is not to blame, although paradox and contradiction is to be avoided. Whether 
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circularity, reflexivity, and self-reference are invalid in general: that is the question. 
The proper answer must be that they are not invalid in general, but some of them are 
valid, others invalid.  
 
 
The Existence of Positive Self-Reference 
 
The nature of self-reference in general involves constructs of meaning which as 
statements regard their own expression, presuppositions, or consequences; relating 
to either the syntactical, semantic, or pragmatic aspects of language use. They 
comment on themselves. They redefine or ascribe something to themselves. If this is 
consistent with the statement, it’s necessary presuppositions and implied 
consequences, then the self-reference created is self-referentially consistent, or, as I 
call it, positive. If not, the self-reference is self-referentially inconsistent, or, as I call it, 
negative. Whatever is consequently redefined or re-ascribed by the created self-
reference may either create a contradiction or not. The force leading us to want to 
avoid contradictions and paradoxes is that they are impossible, not as possible 
constructions of meaning, but as possible valid understanding, description, and 
action plans. They cannot be understood. They cannot be referred to anything, and 
they cannot consistently be carried out and acted upon. Gregory Bateson analyzed 
the dynamics of the Liar Paradox in his book Mind and Nature. Bateson claims that 
the paradox is created by a classification and a meta-classification. By presenting the 
paradox as two quotations, a small quotation within the bigger quotation, Bateson 
stated the Liar paradox as: “Epimenides was a Cretan who said: “Cretans always 
lie””. The big quotation classifies the small quotation, until the small quotation takes 
over the mastery and reclassifies the big quotation, thereby creating a contradiction 
(Bateson 1984:118). The problem is that the redefinition, reclassification, re-
ascription, or the comment made by a statement on itself, contradicts it. I refer to 
circularity, reflexivity, and self-reference, leading to contradiction with the term 
negative self-reference. 
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Negative self-reference has the properties identified by Russell and others that we 
in general want to avoid when creating constructs of meaning. Negative self-
references may have the following inherent properties: they lead to contradiction, 
they lead to paradoxes and logical indeterminability, they are inconsistent and 
incoherent, they are self-rejecting, they are self-denying, they are self-dissolving 
regarding their own meaning, they are self-invalidating, they are self-refuting, self-
destructing, self-falsifying, self-defeating, self-deconstructing, vicious, or self-
terminating. When self-references are complete in the sense of claiming the 
referential relationship included in the reference itself, they are merely impossible, 
and accordingly meaningless as statements. Negative self-references are vicious in 
their circularity because they redefine or re-ascribe or comment on themselves 
something which contradicts either the statement itself directly, or contradicts 
indirectly it’s necessary presuppositions, or consequences. What is revealed in a 
negative self-reference is that the analysis of the consequences of a certain 
statement turns out to be most dangerous to the statement itself, due to the created 
contradiction. The negative self-reference also exists as an indirect self-reference, as 
in for example: "The next sentence is true. The previous sentence is not true".  A 
logical loop like this generates an indeterminacy of meaning due to the infinite 
regress we cannot escape, and contradicts the basic pragmatic idea that we state 
something we at least think is possibly true. Since such a sentence could not 
possibly be true due to its indeterminability it contradicts the general “truth-seeking” 
purpose of stating something in an act of communication. Karl Popper constructed a 
famous indirect negative self-reference in a virtual dialogue going on between 
Socrates and Theaetetus.  
 
“Theaetetus: The next assertion I am going to make is a true one”.  
 
Socrates: Don’t you always speak the truth? 
 
Theaetetus: The last assertion I made was untrue” (Popper 1954:163-164). 
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Whether a self-reference directly entails a contradiction as, “I am lying”, or does so 
indirectly as in the above examples, it is negative.  
 
Positive self-reference does not entail contradiction. What happens when the 
redefinition, reclassification, re-ascription, or the comment made by a statement 
about itself does not contradict it? Then self-reference would in this case not entail 
contradiction. If Bordum from Copenhagen said “People from Copenhagen usually do 
not lie”, the statement would also possess an inherent reflexivity as with the 
statement of Epimenides, but would not contradict itself. In this case the self-
reference would not be negative, but positive. Positive self-references could have the 
useful properties of being self-validating, self-demonstrating, generative or self-
generating, self-affirming, self-exemplifying, self-warranting, self-confirming, self-
guaranteeing, self-creating, self-verifying, self-fulfilling, self-justifying, self-elevating, 
or self-correcting. Constructs of positive self-reference exhibit the properties of being 
consistent and coherent. They may also be dynamic and pragmatically useful. I am 
not the first to point this out. W. D. Hart concludes his article On Self-Reference by 
saying: “…but insulating self-reference is not abandoning it, and for the sake of 
preserving such desirable phenomena as self-applicability, self-reference should not 
be abandoned” (Hart 1970:528). A positive self-reference redefines, re-ascribes, or 
comments upon itself expressing something, which is consistent with the statement 
itself. What is most important to me in this regard, is that a self-reference can be 
constructed in such a way that the reference to itself in fact exemplifies it’s meaning. 
Whereas negative self-references contradict the meaning of the statement, the 
positive self-reference often exemplifies the meaning of the sentence, thus creating a 
relationship which in consequence is self-supporting, self-affirming, or self-
exemplifying. 
 16
 
 
 
Properties of Negative Self-
References 
 
Properties of Positive Self-
References 
 
 
Inconsistent 
Incoherent 
Indeterminable 
Self-contradictory 
Self-rejecting 
Self-denying 
Self-dissolving 
Self-invalidating 
Self-refuting 
Self-degenerating 
Self-destructing 
Self-falsifying 
Self-defeating 
Self-terminating 
Self-deconstructing 
Vicious 
 
 
Consistent 
Coherent 
Generative 
Contradiction not implied 
Self-justifying 
Self-affirming 
Self-exemplifying  
Self-validating / self-guaranteeing 
Self-warranting 
Self-generating / self-correcting 
Self-creating  
Self-verifying / self-confirming 
Self-demonstrating 
Self-sustaining / self-fulfilling 
Self-elevating 
Virtuous 
 
 
If self-reference always leads to paradox and contradiction, then self-reference is 
also a general problem, in theory as well as in practice. The existence of positive 
self-reference on the other hand, would falsify that self-reference in general is a 
problem. The positive self-reference would also demonstrate that self-reference is 
possible, falsifying the idea that all self-references are impossible. What Russell in 
effect says, is, “all self-reference entails contradiction”. A single example and just one 
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example, of a self-reference not leading to contradiction would falsify the assumption 
that all self-reference entails contradiction. It is not different from the observation of a 
black swan, which forces us to give up the idea that all swans are white. Universal 
statements of laws are very useful, but also very vulnerable to falsification (Popper 
1959). There are plenty examples of negative self-references leading to paradox or 
contradiction like: 
 
“This sentence is false” (Jørgensen 1953:290) (Hart 1970:523) 
 
“This sentence has no letters” (Bordum – right here) 
 
There are also examples of a number of non-contradictory positive self-references 
not leading to paradox or contradictions:  
 
“This sentence is in English (Hart 1970:523) 
 
“This sentence consists of six words” (Jørgensen 1953:291) 
 
“This sentence contains five words” (Hart 1970:524) 
 
“This sentence contains precisely forty-five letters” 
 
“This sentence has thirty-three letters” (Foerster 1992:73). 
 
Alf Ross and Niklas Luhmann call positive self-references harmless (Ross 1969:12) 
(Luhmann 1990:137). This is an understatement, because they are in fact very 
useful. The rhetoric consequence of calling them harmless is to direct attention away 
from them. It is another way to say that no one should bother to look into them. This 
is pure ideology, because the existence of meaningful positive self-references is very 
harmful to the conviction that all self-reference entails contradiction. The conviction 
that all self-references entail contradiction is, by the existence of positive self-
reference, demonstrated false. The conclusion which results is that the consensus 
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existing between logicians of the 1900’s that self-references lead to paradoxes and 
contradictions is simply false. This point has also been made by D. A. Wheewell, who 
concluded his analysis by saying: “Once the theory that all self-referring propositions 
are illegitimate, or that some easily specifiable sub-class of such propositions is 
illegitimate, is abandoned, as it must be, then some means has to be found for 
distinguishing harmless from harmful types of self-reference (Wheewell 1987:39).  
 
 
The Reflexivity Test and the Positive Self-Reference 
 
An important property of positive self-reference is that it is self-exemplifying and self-
confirming. Bruno Latour inspired me to see the positive self-reference as self-
exemplifying when he argued: 
 
"Instead of being self-contradictory as if we were requesting for 
ourselves a privileged access to truth that we would deny others, we 
are simply self-exemplifying. Our own claims too gain in robustness if 
we tie their fate to other more solid claims until they withstand trials so 
well that no one can bend or break them" (Latour 1989:104).  
 
Reality kicks back, as Karl Popper said, but so do self-referential constructs of 
meaning. Either the self-relation kicks back by contradicting or not contradicting. We 
may actually convert a negative self-reference into a positive so that it has the 
characteristic of being self-exemplifying.  
 
“This sentence is not a sentence” (may be changed into) 
 
“This sentence is a sentence”  
 
In the negative self-reference, the statement is not confirmed or exemplified by itself. 
In the positive self-reference, the meaning constructed by the sentence is confirmed 
and exemplified by itself. We may in a certain way point to the second sentence itself 
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if we were to explain the meaning of the sentence. If we used the first sentence to 
explain the meaning of a sentence we would get into a contradiction regarding the 
meaning of a sentence. As soon as our addressee understood the concept of a 
sentence, the contradiction would occur. Another example is:  
 
“This sentence has no letters” (may be changed into) 
 
“This sentence has thirty-three letters” 
 
If we were to explain the meaning of “thirty-three letters”, we could apply the second 
sentence itself in order to explain it. We could count the number of letters and 
demonstrate that the sentence itself actually contains thirty-three letters, and is self-
exemplifying in regard to it’s own meaning. The possibility of constructing a meaning 
which is self-referentially relating to itself, without creating a contradiction, 
demonstrates the existence of positive self-reference. We actually always explain the 
meaning of things and concepts to children and others by applying other constructs 
of meaning they have already learned to handle and understand. Learning by 
discourse would be impossible without some kind of positive self-reference regarding 
meaning built into language and the act of communication.  
     The example “this sentence has thirty-one letters”, given by Heinz von Foerster, 
and the fact that we can convert a negative self-reference leading to paradox or 
contradiction into a positive self-reference devoid of contradiction, has inspired me to 
use reflexivity to test sentences regarding their meaning. If we substitute the subject 
of a sentence in a construct of meaning with another, then the sentence produced 
may either become meaningless, contradict, or not contradict the sentence we try to 
express ourselves meaningfully by stating.  
     We may take as example, “This X is not a sentence”, and use the unknown X to 
denote that this part of the sentence may be substituted with any construct of 
meaning. Then we can test different constructs of meaning as to whether they create 
meaninglessness, contradiction, are meaningful without contradiction, or like the 
positive self-reference, are without contradiction and also have the property of being 
self-exemplifying. If we substitute X with “horse” then the sentence would become 
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“this horse is not a sentence”. This sentence is meaningful in certain contexts without 
contradiction. If we substituted with “proposition”, “sentence”, “statement”, “utterance, 
“phrase”, etc., the sentence would deny itself regarding it’s meaning, and the 
substitution would create self-referential contradiction, as in “this sentence is not a 
sentence”. By applying the reflexivity-test, or the test for positive self-reference, we 
may distinguish the substitutions which make sense from those which do not make 
sense. This can be used to criticize complex and complicated constructs of meaning 
involving self-reference, and can be used to judge their reflexive validity. This may 
become a critical tool with many counter-intuitive and unexpected implications.  
     If we take the sentence, “this sentence has no letters”, it’s meaning is self-
deconstructing, self-contradictory, etc. It is a negative self-reference. This may be 
converted into a positive self-reference by substituting “no letters” with “thirty-three 
letters”. This substitution would produce the sentence “this sentence has thirty-three 
letters”, which is self-exemplifying. If we reconstruct the sentence as a reflexivity-test, 
the sentence “this sentence has X letters” has a peculiar property if we restrict 
meaning to the number of letters. Then we may systematically substitute the X with 
any number from the defined set of numbers. By simple induction by enumeration we 
can test all numbers and see which constructs of meaning become self-exemplifying 
positive self-references. The two sentences “This sentence has thirty-one letters”, 
and “This sentence has thirty-three letters”, are self-exemplifying because they 
contain exactly the number of letters claimed by the sentences. They are examples 
of a positive self-reference because they demonstrate exactly the meaningful 
characteristics they claim for themselves (Foerster 1992:73). All other numbers would 
not give the sentence the property of being self-exemplifying, and would create a 
contradiction regarding the meaningfulness of the sentence. In this example we can 
systematically discriminate between those numbers which by substitution produce a 
contradiction and those which do not. We can distinguish the negative from the 
positive self-references. If we do not restrict the meaning to the set of numbers, then 
we could also substitute X with “a capital letter”, “small-case letters”, “Latin letters”, 
“four spaces”, “two quotation-marks”, and “22 letters” (22 is written as a number 
which is not to be counted as letters). In all these cases the sentence produced 
exemplifies it’s own meaning. In each case the constructs of meaning in a statement 
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are reflexively valid and consistent regarding it’s own statement. Each of the positive 
self-references constructed are meaningful because we understand them perfectly 
well. By changing the perspective to that of a reflexivity-test we can see that some 
constructs of meaning explicated in sentences can pass such a reflexivity test. The 
statements which pass the test are the positive self-references. The statements 
failing the test are the negative self-references.  
 
 
 
Negative Self-
Reference  
 
 
Positive Self-
Reference 
 
Reflexivity-test 
 
 
Example: “This 
sentence has no 
letters”. 
 
Example: “This 
sentence has thirty-
three letters”. 
 
Example: “This 
sentence has ..X?.. 
letters” 
 
 
This sentence has 
the property of 
contradicting itself. 
 
This sentence has the 
property of 
exemplifying itself. If 
we count the number 
of letters it 
demonstrates it’s own 
meaning.  
 
Depending on how 
we substitute the X 
we may produce 
either positive or 
negative self-
references. 
 
 
 
The reflexivity-test can be specified as asking which substituted constructs of 
meaning would produce a self-exemplifying positive self-reference. We now know 
that under certain conditions a sentence could exemplify it’s own meaning and 
become a positive self-reference. This sentence would have the important property of 
being self-referentially valid and able to pass the test of reflexivity.  
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     The Danish positivist Jørgen Jørgensen says that we may apply sentences to 
comment on other sentences, but that we should ban all sentences from referring to 
themselves (Jørgensen 1953:291). But this prohibition is no different from the ban 
made by Russell and others. It is not rationally justified, because even if we banned 
sentences referring to or commenting on themselves, we would still be faced with the 
problem of indirect self-reference (Ross 1969:13-14). Indirect self-references may be 
constructed as self-references created between statements, or as pragmatic self-
references establishing a relation to their own pragmatic presuppositions or 
consequences.  
     The story has been told about the idiot who was asked whether the indicator lights 
on the car worked. His respond was “yes – no – yes – no – yes – no…….”. Although 
seemingly a paradox this is not. A contradiction would be “it works and it does not 
work”, but dividing the answers into a temporal process would dissolve the apparent 
contradiction. Jørgen Jørgensen and Alf Ross suggest a method of transcription 
which takes the temporal processes into account while transcribing the reflexive 
phenomena. Such an explicit transcription stating act by act, and step by step, and 
always demanding a positive correpondence would, according to Jørgensen and 
Ross, demonstrate reflexive phenomena to be non-existing (Jørgensen 1953:289, 
299), or merely meaningless (Ross 1969:16). Even if we, with a method of 
transcription, could prove that reflexive and self-referring statements were without 
direct correspondence to some observable reality or correspondence to a direct 
representation of such a reality, the effect of such a demand for one-to-one 
correspondence would be a ban on reflexivity as such. This would also imply a ban 
on the reflexivity of mind, and the reflexivity emerging in processes of 
communication. A ban on reflexivity grounded in correspondence theory does not 
correspond to the pragmatic reality of communication and the self-referential working 
of ordinary language. Theories must first make sense in human terms, since theories 
must define their concepts in ordinary language to begin with. If ordinary language is 
self-referential, then theoretical language is also submitted to this fact. A natural 
language can represent anything else, as well as itself and it’s own relations. 
Ordinary language is self-referential and is the ultimate meta-language (Popper 
1954) (Habermas 1998:64) (Habermas 1996:348). The possibility of self-reference is 
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thus build into language as such. This is no different from the fact that self-
consciousness is itself a part of consciousness (Grue-Sørensen 1950:125). 
     Discourses carried out in ordinary language are self-correcting, and self-
redefining. Discourses actually produce themselves by the fact that sentences are 
commenting on other sentences, and sometimes also on themselves. Discourses 
create a complicated network of references referring back to what has already been 
said, and sometimes to what will be said. The ban derived from a demand for 
correspondence would ban not only reflexivity in all it’s useful forms, but also the 
reflexive dialectic communication actually taking place between people. If Russell 
and his friends were reduced to an illegitimate language police, Jørgensen and Ross 
would in consequence also destroy their own foundation for participating in a debate 
regarding self-reference. What are they actually referring to when they use the 
concepts self-reference and reflexivity, if such phenomena do not exist? Asking this 
question is another way of demonstrating the standard problem regarding 
correspondence theory of truth. If we ask what is correspondence or wherein does 
correspondence exist, the person arguing in favor of correspondence can only argue 
by assuming correspondence in order to give the argument. This is begging the 
question. They seem to run into a performative contradiction, if reflexivity of 
communication is a necessary property of linguistic communication in ordinary 
language and in scientific discourses.  
     Reflexivity is meaning turning toward itself. This happens in statements when they 
redefine, reclassify, meta-classify, re-ascribe, or comment on themselves. Because 
meanings can be unfolded or infolded in constructs of meaning, we cannot solve the 
problem of self-reference, as positivist thinkers Jørgen Jørgensen and Alf Ross have 
suggested, by just transcribing the self-reference and insisting that the reference 
corresponds to something we can identify as a self-delineated thing like a material 
object. The question is whether such a correspondence theory could get rid of self-
reference at all, if we identify and re-identify individuals and individual concepts self-
referentially, as self-delineating entities (Løfgren 1979:219). As Niklas Luhmann 
writes, we cannot, after René Descartes, have a modern concept of the individual, 
whether of individual persons or things, without self-reference. "By Descartes' time, 
medieval scholastic debate had settled one thing about the individuality of the 
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individual: individuality cannot be defined by pointing to some special quality of the 
individual in counter-distinction to other qualities; it is not given to an individual from 
the outside. An individual is itself the source of it's own individuality; the concept of 
individuality, therefore has to be defined by self-reference. All kinds of individual 
beings, not only humans, are defined by self-reference" (Luhmann 1990:108). 
Accordingly the individual had to be conceptualized as being individualized through 
itself, and in individuation resided the difference between the individual and 
everything else (Luhmann 1995:257). Individuality is then determined by self-
reference. If this is the case, then correspondence to individuality would not solve the 
problem of self-reference. 
     If we understand self-reference and reflexivity merely with an optic limited to the 
syntax and semantics, then the arguments given by Jørgen Jørgensen and Alf Ross 
are, in my opinion, reasonable. The problem is that the conclusion they derive 
presupposes the exclusion of the pragmatics, the reality of intersubjective 
communication, and the fact that the meaning of a sentence is also dependent on it’s 
use. That meaning is use has been learned from the writings of Wittgenstein, 
Austin, Searle, and Habermas. The statement, “the meaning of the word use is its 
use”, is in fact itself self-referential. In communicative processes we can refer 
propositions to propositions and even to unfinished constructs of meaning in order to 
clarify meaning. We may enter into explicative discourses if the meaning has to be 
clarified in order to continue the communication. Thus the positivist premise that 
sentences cannot refer to themselves, but only to other completed sentences, fails 
on the pragmatic level. Most self-referential language makes sense to those involved. 
This is why it is so important to include all three linguistic levels; the syntactical, the 
semantic, and the pragmatic. They cannot be isolated if communication and meaning 
is to be understood properly. Syntactic meaningfulness can be substituted by 
pragmatic meaningfulness, like when communicating “egg” by simulating a hen 
laying eggs to somebody we do not share any linguistic expressions with. Positivists 
are blind to this fact of communication when reducing away pragmatics. The 
pragmatic level is what makes language the medium for coordination of action, and 
the medium for instructing actions linguistically, and of performing illucutionary acts 
like warning, ordering, promising, demanding, etc. (Searle 1988:23). The positivist 
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demand for correspondence seems to run into problems with a sentence like: ”In this 
sentence the commas are absent”. 
      The problem of indirect self-reference, and the problem of self-reference in 
dialogues between people are not easy to escape. Trying to ban self-reference in a 
reflexive game of communication is like being situated within a paradox. If we take 
the pragmatic act of ordering we may construct an indirect negative self-reference 
which is impossible to escape. 
 
“Read the next sentence!” 
 
“Read the former sentence!” 
 
This exemplifies indirect negative self-reference and the infinite regression we know 
from certain paradoxes, because you could not read this if you were really obeying 
the instructions. You would oscillate between the two statements forever. A 
pragmatic contradiction would occur if you claimed that you take the orders seriously 
and at the same time stopped reading. Pragmatic contradictions are, like semantic 
contradictions, to be avoided. One type of pragmatic contradiction is the performative 
contradiction. 
 
 
The Performative Contradiction 
 
When a statement is made, it has a syntactical and semantic aspect relating to what it 
states. But a statement also has a pragmatic aspect relating to how the statement is 
stated, and how it is meant. The pragmatic conditions wherein a statement is stated 
may conflict with what is actually stated, and in this way will create a pragmatic 
contradiction. Self-reference may be created by circularly connecting the pragmatic 
with the semantic claim. In such cases a statement is pragmatically, or performatively 
self-referential. Jaakko Hintikka defined a performative contradiction formally as: 
 
 26
"A performative contradiction occurs when a constative speech act k(p) rests on 
noncontingent presuppositions whose propositional content contradicts the 
asserted proposition p" (Habermas 1993:80). 
 
A performative contradiction arises, for example, in the case where a speaker makes 
performative use of something which is expressively denied (Habermas 1993:129). 
The schema below shows some examples of statements involving performative 
contradiction or performative self-contradiction. 
 
 
Examples of Statements Entailing Performative Contradiction 
 
 
• “My existence is impossible” 
 
• “I do not exist here and now” 
 
• “I say nothing” 
 
• “No-one should generalize” 
 
• “All persons ought not to express themselves normatively” 
 
• “I can’t say ‘Bordum’” 
 
• “No sentences can be true” 
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In all of the above assertions, a presupposed and necessary implicit relationship is 
explicitly denied. In the first two sentences, the speaker’s existence is a necessary 
condition for expressing the sentences which deny the speaker’s existence. In the 
third sentence, the necessary condition for denying that anything is being said is that 
the speaker can in fact say it. In the fourth sentence, the speaker is necessarily 
generalizing while contradicting by saying that generalizations should not be allowed. 
In the fifth sentence, the speaker is necessarily being normative while saying that no-
one ought to be normative. In the sixth sentence, the necessary condition for saying 
what is said is that what is said is false. In the seventh sentence, the presupposition 
for the sentence being true is contradicted by the sentence itself. In all the above 
cases, a contradiction arises due to the performative or pragmatic presuppositions or 
implications of the statement. Performative contradictions are therefore pragmatically 
self-refuting, self-invalidating, self-destructing, self-falsifying, or self-defeating. They 
are no better than semantic contradiction.  
     In logic it is often assumed that a valid formula is not only true, but necessarily 
true (Hughes 1968:28-29). Modally we typically distinguish the modes of 
impossibility, necessity and contingency. Contingency is defined as that which is not 
impossible and not necessary (Hughes 1968:22) (Luhmann 1995:24). Empirical 
judgments are consequently contingent (Kant 1951:10). A performative contradiction 
is a constative speech act where the content contradicts necessary presuppositions 
for producing the speech act, which could not be otherwise. Contingent 
presuppositions, which could be otherwise because they are neither impossible nor 
necessary, would not lead to a performative contradiction.  
     The performative contradiction is connected with statements of universal law-like 
statements. The quantifier of a sentence therefore matters as to whether a statement 
could entail performative contradiction at all. If all S are P, it follows that a given S 
also is P, with conceptual and logical necessity. Since necessity as modality is bound 
to universal quantification, it is worth noting that the quantification of an assertion is a 
conclusive indication of whether there could arise a performative contradiction at all. 
Universal and singular quantifiers are both treated as universal quantifiers (Popper 
1959:122), because it is the subject of the sentence which is, either completely or 
partly, ascribed the predicate or property. Basically, we treat singular statements the 
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same way we treat universal statements. When we say: “all men are mortal” we know 
that Socrates is mortal because he is a man. When we say: “Socrates is mortal” we 
actually mean that Socrates as a whole is mortal. In both cases, the predicate is 
assumed to cover the subject completely. If the speech act rests on contingent 
presuppositions it could never become a performative contradiction, according to 
Hintikka’s definition. This is why performative contradictions do not necessarily arise 
when we quantify statements as particular statements. Some examples of particular 
statements not necessarily leading to performative contradiction are:  
 
1b. “Some persons’ existence is impossible” (The perfect) 
2b. “Some persons do not exist here and now” (The dead or unborn) 
3b. “Some persons say nothing” (The mute) 
4b. “Some persons should never generalize” (Empiricists) 
5b. “Some persons should not express themselves normatively” (Moralizing persons) 
6b. “Some people can’t say “Bordum” (Try with Danish accent! And stop saying 
Boredom) 
7b. “Some sentences are not true” (Too often the case) 
 
If we say “all human beings” we necessarily include ourselves, due to the 
quantification “all”. If we say “some human beings”, we are not necessarily included 
ourselves, and would accordingly not necessarily contradict the necessary 
presuppositions for stating the statement. The quantifier can give us a little analytical 
help because the performative contradiction presupposes that the speaker is herself 
directly or indirectly included in the subject of the sentence stated. The fact that we 
can express ourselves in universal terms, stating something about all or none, or can 
use the temporal senses always or never, may create a self-referential relationship 
between the speaker and the propositional content if universal quantification is 
applied which includes the speaker herself. If a speaker is generalizing we may 
legitimately expect that the speaker is also included in the generalization, and at least 
is expressing herself. Someone who says, “everybody cheats”, we can interpret as 
saying “I cheat”. Often, the performative contradiction arises in statements where the 
speaker is implicitly included and explicitly excluded at the same time. 
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The logical asymmetry between universal and particular quantification of sentences 
has implications as to whether we could contradict the “noncontingent 
presuppositions”. If we translate “noncontingent presuppositions” into impossible or 
necessary presuppostions we can paraphrase the definition of a performative 
contradiction. A performative contradiction occurs when a constative speech act k(p) 
rests on impossible or necessary presuppositions contradicted by the asserted 
proposition p. In a performative contradiction the stated proposition p would 
contradict the impossible or necessary, which is obviously ignorant.  
     We can get some inspiration in understanding the prohibition against performative 
self-contradiction from Aristotle. Aristotle argued that we deliberate on the contingent, 
not the necessary and impossible, because these questions do not demand 
deliberation.   
 
"Now no one deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise nor 
about things that are impossible for him to do" (Aristotle 
1984:1140a31).  
 
A performative contradiction breaks with the principle that we only deliberate on the 
contingent, because the speech act’s content claims that that which could not be 
different, is different. The speech act contradicts necessary presuppositions applying 
to itself. In a performative contradiction it is basically claimed that the impossible is 
possible or that the necessary could be otherwise. Herein stands the contradiction.  
 
 
The Performative Self-Reference 
 
The performative contradiction entails a contradiction, and is therefore to be avoided. 
It is a negative self-reference. But not all performative self-references entail 
contradiction. Some are positive self-references without contradiction. A famous 
example of a performative self-reference which is positive and indirect is constructed 
by Karl Popper.  
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Socrates: Could you produce an example of a self-referring assertion which is 
empirically true? 
 
Theaetetus: ………………………………………….. 
 
Socrates: I could not hear what you were saying, Theaetetus. Please repeat it 
a little louder. My hearing is no longer what it used to be. 
 
Theaetetus: I said “I am now speaking so softly that dear old Socrates cannot 
make out what I am saying” (Popper 1954:164). 
 
In this dialogue Theaetetus is empirically performing a dialogue establishing a self-
reference which, when the second sentence is explicated in the fourth sentence, 
demonstrates and exemplifies what he said in the second sentence, making it 
meaningful to Socrates. Sentence 4 becomes the presupposition of understanding 
sentence 2, which is the presupposition of understanding sentence 4, etc. Sentences 
2 and 4 performatively, and in a circular way, entail each other regarding their 
meaning and self-confirming truth.  
      A performative positive self-reference occurs when a speech act k(p) rests on 
noncontingent presuppositions whose propositional content does not contradict the 
asserted proposition p. 
     Some examples of performative self-references free of contradiction are 
sentences where the necessary presuppositions are confirmed by the sentence: 
 
“I speak” 
 
“I am I” 
 
“I promise that I keep my promise” 
 
The necessary presupposition for stating the first statement is that the speaker 
speaks, which is exactly what the proposition claims. The second sentence could 
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have been spoken by Fichte, and presupposes what is said. The third sentence may 
exhibit redundancy, but nevertheless regards itself performatively in a self-sustaining 
way.  
     We can now formally define positive self-reference as the logical complement to a 
performative contradiction. A sentence is positively self-referring when a speech act 
p rests on necessary or contingent presuppositions affirmed by the asserted 
proposition p, or rests on impossible presuppositions negated by the asserted 
proposition p. 
     As to the above analysis of self-reference, we can now conclude that a ban 
against self-reference, whether against self-referring sentences, be they direct, or 
indirect, or performative self-reference, has no justification, if we include the 
pragmatic aspect of language in our analysis of self-reference. Some positive self-
references are consistent, self-exemplifying, and very useful. The negative self-
references are inconsistent and contradictory, and may lead to paradoxes and 
indeterminability. They are self-refuting, self-invalidating, and useless. Even though 
contradiction and paradox are to be avoided we cannot blame the self-reference or 
reflexivity involved, but must blame only negative self-references. The positive self-
references must be released from prohibition.  
 
 
Complete Self-Reference is Impossible 
 
We have already seen that the pragmatic dimension is often excluded without this 
exclusion itself being justified. In logic it is most often only the syntactical and 
semantic dimensions of language, which are taken into account. The discussion 
whether or not all self-references have the same logical structure has been going on 
for a while (Priest 1994, N. J.J. Smith 2000). To me such a discussion reflects the 
fact that logicians restrict the problem of self-reference to the syntactical and 
semantic level. At the pragmatic level, the concrete praxis referred to directly or 
indirectly will often be contingent and therefore will not reflect a pre-given structure. 
Consequently, we cannot predict and judge validity or invalidity from structure alone, 
as in a deductive inference. The role of the structure of self-references is restricted to 
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developing structures for a rational reconstruction of instances of pragmatic self-
reference. But some things can be said about self-references in general, e.g., that a 
self-reference cannot be complete if we understand it as a proposition establishing 
some sort of relation to itself, either syntactically, semantically or pragmatically.  
     In formal logic, self-reference is often defined as complete or total self-reference 
(Grue-Sørensen 1950:23). If self-reference is a relation, as the concept of reference 
suggests, then complete self-reference must also encompass this relationship in 
order to be complete. I would argue that complete self-reference is not possible 
because it entails problems of the same kind Russell encountered with his paradox. If 
a self-reference consists in establishing some sort of relationship to itself there would 
be no room for this relation if the self-reference were complete. Completeness would 
demand that not only the self-reference was complete, but also that it would include 
its own referential relationship – but where should that possibly be located in a 
complete self-reference?   
     Some people write notes to remember what to do, and shopping lists in order to 
remember what to buy. If somebody wrote a list of things to remember and on that list 
added where the list itself was, in order to remember it, would this be a complete list 
without this self-reference? My point is that talking about total or complete self-
reference is not different from talking about the set of all sets or the class of 
everything. We run into problems of self-reference if we, in the concept of everything, 
also want to include nothing and the negation of everything. We run into problems if 
we in everything want to include the set of everything itself, either as a whole or as a 
totality of it’s own sub-sets.  
     Complete self-reference is impossible and invalid (Jørgensen 1953:292). If self-
reference metaphorically can be described as a snake swallowing it’s own tail, then 
complete self-reference would imply the snake swallowing itself, which is a self-
refuting thought leading to nothing. Other standard examples of the problems 
involved in complete self-reference are the map mapping everything including itself, 
and the painter painting everything including himself as a painter. Complete self-
reference would be like the mirror mirroring everything, including itself, and it’s 
mirroring function (Grue-Sørensen 1950). Complete self-reference can be 
understood as a doubling which cannot account for itself. This is why complete self-
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reference is impossible. Niklas Luhmann formulates the point as "but since we know 
that unrestricted self-reference is impossible for purely logical reasons..." (Luhmann 
1990:137) and  "pure self-reference in the sense of 'relating only and exclusively to 
itself' is impossible" (Luhmann 1995:446). A relation presupposes two terms or 
entities. If these terms are assumed to be identical in a complete self-reference, how 
can we speak of a relation if there is only one term, or of a relationship between 
completely identical terms? (Grue-Sørensen 1950:23).  
     If the self-reference is understood in analogy to a computer program, the problem 
with complete self-reference can be stated as: “the more total a self-reference is, the 
more difficult will it be to find room (freedom) to unfold (explain) it” (Løfgren 
1979:209). Løfgren writes of the problem with the complete self-reference: 
 
"Hence, both alternatives are limited by Tarski´s result concerning the 
impossibility of a completely self-referring scientific language. Although 
complete self-reference is not possible, partial self-reference is" (Løfgren 
1979:227). 
 
The problem with complete self-reference was, by Alan Turing, formulated as “How 
should a completely self-referential computer program start and stop, if there is not 
place to an independent decision-making instance?”. Turing understood self-
reference in term of a 'halting problem', and showed that complete self-reference 
entails indeterminability. The result from Alfred Tarski (Davidson 1996:270), and Kurt 
Gödel (Gödel 1931), that we can not expect to be able to construct description 
systems which are both complete and consistent, can be interpreted as logical 
arguments supporting the thesis that complete self-reference is impossible (Løfgren 
1979:227) (Apel 1988:406).  
     A complete or total self-reference cannot be established if self-reference is 
understood as a relation. What is left is a partial self-reference or no self-reference at 
all. This does not mean that we cannot have symbol systems which can handle self-
referential relationships, like ordinary language, and some software compilers. 
Constructs like these merely prove that self-reference can work, and can be a 
positive phenomena.  
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The Münchhausen Trilemma 
 
According to the legend, Baron von Münchhausen was riding his horse, got stuck in 
the mud, and pulled himself and his horse up by pulling his own pigtail.  
     One of the most devastating arguments directed at deductive justification is the 
so-called Münchhausen Trilemma, presented first by J.F. Fries and later by Hans 
Albert. The argument hits the core of classical epistemology, rationalism, and 
cognitivism. The trilemma has not only attacked the conviction that knowledge is 
secure regarding it’s foundation, but also the idea that we can rationally justify our 
knowledge and actions. According to Karl Popper, J.F. Fries was a thinker who was 
deeply concerned with the problem of the basis or foundation of experience.  
 
"He taught that, if the statements of science are not to be accepted 
dogmatically, we must be able to justify them. If we demand justification by 
reasoned argument, in the logical sense, then we are committed to the view 
that statements can be justified only by statements. The demand that all 
statements are to be logically justified (described by Fries as a 'predilection for 
proofs') is therefore bound to lead to an infinite regress. Now, if we want to 
avoid the danger of dogmatism as well as an infinite regress, then it seems as 
if we could only have recourse to psychologism, i.e. the doctrine that 
statements can be justified not only by statements but also by perceptual 
experience. Faced with this trilemma -dogmatism vs. infinite regress vs. 
psychologism - Fries, and with him almost all epistemologists who wished to 
account for our empirical knowledge, opted for psychologism" (Popper 
1959:93-94). 
 
Psychologism has been seriously criticized from Plato to Edmund Husserl and does 
not seem to solve the problem of justifying our beliefs, and certainly not of justifying 
beliefs intersubjectively. In fact we never justify basic statements by perceptual 
experiences (Popper 1959:105). In modern time, Hans Albert took up the trilemma, 
and gave it a more logical form.  
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What Hans Albert points out is that there seems to be an agreement that valid 
justification is justification by use of deductive arguments. Deductions preserve 
whatever truth is stated in their premises. This gives rise to the idea that we can refer 
a proposition back to some secure and indubitable grounds by logical means. But if 
we demand justification for everything and therefore also for the secure grounds, we 
must also demand a justification for the knowledge to which one has referred the 
proposition initially requiring foundation (Albert 1985:18). In other words the search 
for a secure foundation requires a deductive justification, but also a justification of the 
foundation of this. In this process of seeking justification of justification we run into 
the Münchhausen Trilemma. We are, according to Hans Albert, left with three equally 
unacceptable choices or lemmas. Either we: 
 
1. Run into an infinite regress, which seems to arise from the necessity to go further 
and further back in the search for foundations, and since it is in practice impossible, 
affords no secure basis. 
 
2. Or, we create a circular argument by running into a logical circle in the deduction, 
which arises because in the process of justification, statements are used which were 
characterized before as in need of foundation, so that they can provide no secure 
basis. 
 
3 Or, we justify with recourse to a dogma by breaking-off the process at a particular 
point, which, admittedly can always be done in principle, but involves an arbitrary 
suspension of the principle of sufficient justification (Albert 1985:18). Justification is 
accordingly reduced to a fundamentalism, absolutism, or dogmatism, which is not 
itself justified. 
 
To Hans Albert, infinite regress and circular argumentation are clearly unacceptable, 
and accordingly his suggestion is to accept an arbitrary breaking-off the process of 
justification. His choice of fundamentalism, absolutism, or dogmatism is justified as 
the least of three evils. He finds it plausible to break-off the justification process, if the 
justification process reaches a point where it is self-evident, self-authenticating, or 
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based on immediate knowledge in intuition or experience (Albert 1985:19). As a 
consequence of this he gives up the idea of foundation in favor of fallibilism, and 
suggests openness and willingness to critical examination as the dogma (Albert 
1985:47-48). 
    The infinite regression is dissatisfactory because it entails indeterminability here 
and now, and indeterminability is an impossible determination, as well as an 
unreliable description. To me the arbitrary breaking-off of the process of justification 
according to some dogma, fundamentalist conviction, or absolutist assumption, as 
preferred by Fries and Albert, is reducing justification to a question of power. It is 
equally unacceptable, because it suspends the idea of rational justification. Jürgen 
Habermas also reacts to this by saying: 
 
"On the face of it, the critical rationalist position breaks completely with 
transcendentalism. It holds that the three horns of the 'Münchhausen 
Trilemma' - logical circularity, infinite regress, and recourse to absolute 
certitude - can only be avoided if one gives up any hope of grounding or 
justifying whatsoever. Here the notion of justification is being dislodged in 
favor of the concept of critical testing, which becomes the critical rationalist´s 
equivalent for justification. In this connection I would argue that criticism is 
itself a procedure whose employment is never presuppositionless" (Habermas 
1993:7). 
 
The trilemma shows that deduction applied to itself leads to a choice between three 
equally unacceptable alternatives. The problem with the trilemma is that that the 
deductive inference is the only one which can secure validity, because only a 
deductive argument is necessarily valid. Therefore it is a problem if deduction breaks 
down by applying self-reference, and attempts deductively to justify the deduction 
itself. Self-referential logic, like formal logic, traditionally remains within language’s 
syntactic and semantic levels, and systematically excludes the pragmatic level 
(Hughes 1968:3). Self-referential logic seeks within these frames a language of 
description which can describe itself, and can handle it’s own semantics in syntactical 
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descriptions (Løfgren 1979:207). It is under the assumption that only deductive 
justifications are valid justification that the trilemma emerges.  
     The Münchhausen trilemma becomes, according to Hans Albert, an argument 
against classic epistemology’s assumption of theoretical monism, the assumption 
that there exists a simple foundation for knowledge and only one authoritative source 
of knowledge (Albert 1985:15). The Münchhausen trilemma becomes an argument 
against every first-philosophy, the so-called “Ursprungsphilosophie”, and against all 
other philosophies, seeking an Archimedic point from where knowledge can be 
derived (Albert 1985:21).  
     A premise for the trilemma is that knowledge in the classic epistemology is 
understood as secure or certain. “Thus the foundationalism of the classical model of 
rationality, which originally aimed at making knowledge secure by linking truth and 
certainty, leads in the last analysis to this: that in order to achieve absolute certainty, 
one must sacrifice realism, and with it the idea of informative truth; for analytic 
sentences are indeed, it is well known – “necessarily” true, but they do not describe 
reality” (Albert 1985:43). Hans Albert’s point is not that the Münchhausen trilemma 
shall lead us to subjectivism, decisionism, or to giving up on justifying our judgement 
at all (Albert 1985:43-45). Albert means, on the other hand, that it is Plato’s classic 
epistemological premise, that knowledge is secure knowledge, understood as that it 
is necessary and unchangeable, which is wrong. The Münchhausen trilemma shall 
be used as an argument for fallibilism, as an argument that we cannot have secure 
knowledge and infallible knowledge, but always on an empirical basis can correct 
eventual errors and thus come closer to knowledge free of error. “To do that we must 
sacrifice the drive for certainty which lies at the root of the classical doctrine, and 
accept the price of permanent uncertainty about whether our theories will continue to 
be confirmed, and thus maintained, in the future” (Albert 1985:44). The alternative to 
the doctrine of secure knowledge is fallibilism. Hans Albert argues that every 
alternative to fallibilism which claims one or another source of knowledge as 
authoritative becomes absolutism, fundamentalism, and is therefore arbitrary - only 
on a higher level (Albert 1985:47). The search after secure knowledge becomes by 
Hans Albert replaced with the idea of  “A critical examination,” a removal of 
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contradictions, and a prohibition against immunization against criticism. All together 
good methodological rules, but not solutions to the problem of justification. 
     There might be two ways out of the trilemma. One way is taken by Jürgen 
Habermas, who defended the strong cognitive and universalistic position of his 
discourse ethics by claiming that the trilemma would not occur in a theory including 
the pragmatic dimension of language and justification.  
     In contradistinction to classical logic, discourse ethics includes the syntactic, 
semantic, as well as the pragmatic language levels, as well as the cognitive, 
normative, and expressive dimensions of validity. On this ground Habermas claims 
that discourse ethics escapes the trilemma.  
 
“The attempt to justify moral principles with universal validity, according to 
Albert, ensnares the cognitivist in a 'Münchhausen trilemma' in which he must 
choose between three equally unacceptable alternatives: putting up with an 
infinite regress, arbitrarily breaking off the chain of deduction, and making a 
circular argument. The status of this trilemma however, is problematic. It 
arises only if one presupposes a semantic concept of justification that is 
oriented to a deductive relationship between statements and based solely on 
the concept of logical inference. This deductive concept of justification is 
obviously too narrow for the exposition of the pragmatic relations between 
argumentative speech” (Habermas 1993:79). 
 
It is in this way within the pragmatic relation, that Habermas sees the possibility to 
emancipate discourse ethics from the trilemma. A discourse may be circular and self-
referential regarding it’s own procedures, but not regarding the content of actual 
discourses taking place. As Stephen Winrich says: “The paradox of self-reference is 
that in human discourse self-reference is always evident but there is the closed and 
the processual (open) aspect of self-reference. The former refers to the circular 
structure, the second to the processual structuring” (Winrich 1984:993). We cannot 
escape the discourse, but we can terminate it from within if rational consensus is 
established. According to discourse ethics, a discourse is not ended with an arbitrary 
claim or by psychologistic self-evidence, but ends insofar as a rational consensus is 
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established among all affected (Habermas 1993:9). The disruption of a discourse by 
agreement is not arbitrary (Popper 1959:104). Rational consensus does not 
necessarily lead to an infinite regress, if consensus can be created, which the formal-
pragmatic procedures for valid argumentation inherent in discourse ethics is a 
guarantee for. Some issues cannot be resolved consensually, but then a consensus 
that consensus cannot be expected to be established can be created, and the 
discussion can stop on rationally justified grounds. Discourse is not a circular 
justification, begging the argument, because the rational consensus is not 
presupposed, but rather constructively created as something which emerges within 
the discourse (Habermas 1993:203). Discourse ethics escapes hereby the 
Münchhausen trilemma, according to Jürgen Habermas.  
     The other way out of the trilemma is the way of the positive self-reference. I have 
demonstrated that not all self-references entail contradiction or paradox. Some self-
references are positive. This means that the lemma of logical circularity immediately 
rejected by Fries, Albert, and others, as a possibly valid justification, actually may be 
a valid justification after all. If we have to justify what a statement is, then we may 
say: “This statement is an example of a statement”. If we were discussing the 
meaning of “thirty-three letters” we could say: “This sentence has thirty-three letters” 
and demonstrate the meaning by counting the letters.  
     Demonstrating the existence of positive self-reference is an argument supporting 
the theory that not all circular arguments are invalid and dissatisfying. It is only the 
negative self-reference which constitutes a lemma. Circularity must be divided into 
positive and negative. The Münchhausen trilemma in fact has four horns or legs, 
where the positive circularity is not a problem at all, but a way out. It only takes a 
single case of positive self-reference to reject the assumption that all circular 
justification is invalid. There is no problem with sentences involving circularity and 
self-reference if they are perfectly understood, and actually in a self-exemplifying or 
self-confirming way express something about themselves which in fact becomes true 
due to their self-referential character, like the sentences: 
 
“This sentence can be read and understood as meaningful” 
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“This sentence is present on this page” 
 
“Does this sentence direct your attention to yourself?” 
 
“You are now reading this sentence” 
 
Where Habermas deconstructs the presuppositions of the trilemma by pointing to the 
exclusion of the pragmatic aspects of justification, I in addition deconstruct the 
content of the trilemma by demonstrating that circularity in some cases are valid. The 
validity of Fries' trilemma becomes therefore delimited to only being valid regarding 
the form of circularity I call negative self-reference. The positive self-reference is 
freed of the trilemma. The positive performative self-reference goes free on both 
grounds.  
  
 
Critical Theory and the Role of Self-Reference 
 
It is obvious that reflexivity and self-reference have come to stay. The biological 
development of DNA-RNA replication, the emergence of self-consciousness, and the 
complexity we have created by constructing societies are important factors creating 
the need for dynamic thinking capable of handling phenomena with self-reference. 
Could we survive without biological self-reproduction, and without self-awareness 
and self-consciousness? Does not reflexivity presuppose self-reference as a form 
contributing to survival? 
     With the development of the computer and the computer-based organization of 
society, the problem of the foundation of mathematics in logic has become even 
more practical. A self-contradictory formal system, or computer program, theory, 
description, or decision is pretty much useless in practice. They lead to two 
incompatible rules of understanding, impossible to implement at the same time. The 
only use we may make of a contradiction is that we get knowledge of a problem to be 
solved, which at best reinforces our own reflectivity. The occurance of contradictions 
forces the rational scientist to continue to work until the contradiction is dissolved or 
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removed. Pointing out a contradiction in a theory can demonstrate that not all it’s 
propositions are true, but it does not help us in judging which propositions are true or 
false. We only know that the theory as a whole cannot possibly be true. If we cannot 
avoid paradoxes and thus contradictions in our thinking, in formal systems like logic, 
mathematics, etc., in theories, in description, in decision-making procedures, etc., 
then the consequences are that those systems lose objectivity, reliability, universal 
applicability, and usefulness. It is thus in itself a paradox or contradiction that we 
create these systems to gain objectivity, reliability, and universal applicability, and 
know that this is not possible. That it is not possible to create an axiomatic system 
which is complete and consistent has been proved by Kurt Gödel in his two theorems 
(Gödel 1931) (Boolos 1994). A computer programmer writing a contradictory code 
into software is obviously creating a practical problem. Either the program will 
produce false results, will not run at all, or the program will stall at some point, losing 
its applicability and reliability. Everybody can recognize this as a problem, but what 
about social scientists, managers, lawyers, politicians, etc.? There is no logical 
compiler to stop the most obvious misunderstandings and no guarantee that 
paradoxes and contradictory constructs of reflexive meaning may not be very harmful 
to society before they are even recognized as being harmful and destructive. 
Contradictions and paradoxes are clearly real theoretical and real practical problems. 
Therefore a modernized critical theory is in need of tools to reveal contradictions 
appearing in complex organizing, planning, theories, arguments, etc. Critical theory 
needs not only formalized theories applying to syntax and semantics, but also 
pragmatic theories applicable to reveal the theoretical inconsistencies created in the 
modern reflexive practices. If I am right, the modern forms of power are hidden in 
ideological functions disguised by complicated reflexivity, making them difficult to 
reveal and cope with. If strategic thinking has reached the intellectual level where 
strategies are reflexive, then the theories intended to reveal these mechanisms must 
also be able to cope with this reflexivity and complexity.   
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Discourse Ethics and The Positive Self-Reference 
 
One who has pursued the idea of rational justification most persistently as a 
foundation for the critical social sciences is Jürgen Habermas. In the following I will 
try to reconstruct his position and demonstrate the affinity of his arguments with 
those of the positive self-reference I have developed.  
     Habermas provided the critical theory and the criticism produced by critical 
theorists with rational argumentation as it’s own foundation. In discourse ethics and 
the theory of communicative action, the traditional conceptions of validity and 
rationality we find in logic and analytic philosophy are integrated with a pragmatic 
analysis of rationality in everyday communication. Habermas has, for nearly 50 
years, focused on the necessary conditions of creating a rational consensus by 
applying sound arguments in discourses regarding the validity of a given contested 
proposition. Consensus may be rare and improbable, but is nevertheless the most 
important source of integration in social relationships in a decentered, secularized, 
and individualized modern world. Whether we talk of a partnership, a group, an 
organization, or a society, it is no more stable than the consensus actually keeping it 
together. It is because of an underlying deeper consensus that we can tolerate 
dissent, and may use it productively, e.g. in negotiation. Consensus transcends love, 
money, power, law, democracy, etc., because they all presuppose some basic 
consensus as to their constitution in order to function. Consensus is understood 
abstractly and reflexively as covering both an agreement to agree, and an agreement 
to disagree. In the cases where we disagree to disagree or disagree to agree on 
something, this something is cognitively indeterminable. No one knows what is being 
talked about. Consensus functions as an intersubjectively established transcendental 
identity of meaning, which is necessary in order to agree and disagree rationally. This 
cognitive basis of consensus is the reason why we may change conflict into 
consensus by conducting a discourse (Habermas 1993:67). 
     In pragmatic theory, it is assumed that consensus or dissent is the main pragmatic 
reactions to statements uttered in communication. As addressees, we judge 
statements in the light of whether we can agree with them or not, and judge whether 
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we find them rationally motivating or not. The conception of consensus produced in 
rational discourses plays an important role in the social justification of norms and 
knowledge. J. F. Fries pointed out that if we demand justification by reasoned ar-
gument, in the logical sense, then we are committed to the view that statements can 
be justified only by statements (Popper 1959:93-94). This point is also made by 
Richard Rorty who said “we can think of knowledge as a relation to propositions, and 
thus of justification as a relation between the propositions in question and other 
propositions from which the former may be inferred” (Rorty 1980:159). According to 
Rorty, we can continue the conversation on a subject infinitely, but it would not be 
meaningful if everyone, the majority, or the wise, are satisfied.  
     We may understand the linguistic turn in philosophy as a change of perspective 
from a subject-object relationship to a proposition-object relationship. This shifts the 
perspective on knowledge and truth from a subject knowing an object, to a 
proposition stating knowledge (Habermas 1998:8). The pragmatic turn may be 
understood as a change from the proposition-object relationship to a proposition-
proposition relationship. These changes arise due to a quest for justification in terms 
of explicit linguistic justification of beliefs by other propositions. The focus on 
justification shifts the perspective to a pragmatic perspective because the justification 
process as a practice of justifying comes into perspective. Charles Sanders Peirce 
made a pragmatic turn when he realized that the meaning of a sign depends on the 
community of interpreters. Ludwig Wittgenstein made a pragmatic turn when he, in 
Philosophical Investigations, in an attempt to connect logic with pragmatics, realized 
that propositions acquire their meaning from their use. The insight that language 
games are contextually bound to lifeforms is summed up in the phrase, “the meaning 
of a word is its use in language” (Wittgenstein 1953:20e§43). Habermas sees this 
development within epistemology and takes in addition a communicative turn, which 
consists in giving up the basic idea in epistemology that justification is merely a 
private or monological matter. The fact is that justification is as equally much a social 
process, taking place in dialogues between people. The change from a monological 
to a dialogical perspective implies a communicative turn in philosophy. Habermas 
takes all these turns in philosophy seriously. The linguistic social practices come into 
focus when taking the communicative turn. Understanding the dialogues taking place 
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between people and understanding how they are conducted ethically becomes 
relevant. This leads Habermas to look at the ethics of discourse and to seek the 
necessary social and ethical foundations of consensus, which are the focal points of 
discourse ethics. 
     A discourse is a dialogue, freed of external and internal constraints, where the 
intersubjective validity of a contested proposition is established by employing the 
unforced force of the better argument to create a rationally motivated agreement 
(Habermas 1984:42). A discourse can be understood as a “truth-seeking” social 
competition over arguments directed at producing a rationally motivated consensus. 
In a discourse, the validity of an understandable and contested proposition is 
measured against criticizable validity-claims, and thereby tested regarding 
propositional truth, normative rightness, and the speakers’ sincerity or truthfulness 
(Habermas 1996:5) (Habermas 1984:75). 
      If the consensus created is based on threats of sanction, rhetorical onslaught, 
calculation, resignation, or desperation, it is merely a de facto consensus (Habermas 
1984:129). Such an agreement is not rational, in the sense that the participants could 
themselves provide valid reasons for it if necessary. If the consensus is merely 
presupposed and taken for granted in an unreflected way, it is an unproblematic 
consensus (Habermas 1984:70). If the involved parties agree on a proposition on 
different grounds is it merely a compromise. If they agree on the same grounds it is a 
rationally motivated consensus (Habermas 1996:166). If the agreement is based on 
the same arguments, and if the validity of these arguments is redeemed under ideal 
conditions regarding their assertability and acceptability, then we may speak of an 
ideal rational consensus (Habermas 1996:14-15). The motivational force, and the 
strength of the consensus, depends on the degree of rational justification of the 
arguments produced in discourses led by valid argumentation. Valid argumentation is 
necessarily free of semantic contradiction and performative contradiction, and is 
acceptable to and accepted by the addressees. The consensus-oriented core of 
Habermas’ position regarding norms is stated in the core principle of discourse 
ethics, which is:  
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"D: Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons 
could agree as participants in rational discourses" (Habermas 1996:107). Also 
stated as: "(D) Only moral rules that could win the assent of all affected as 
participants in a practical discourse can claim validity" (Habermas 1993b:50). 
 
Discourse ethics is contained in a compressed form in this consensus-oriented 
principle. When norms are applied to particular cases, we do it by judging according 
to a principle of appropriateness. When norms are to be justified, the principle takes 
the form of a universalization principle" (Habermas 1996:109). 
 
“(U) For a norm to be valid, the consequences and side effects that its 
general observance can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the 
particular interests of each person affected must be such that all affected can 
accept them freely” (Habermas 1993:120) (Habermas 1996:566). 
 
Habermas understands an action norm as temporally, socially, and substantively 
generalized behavioral expectations (Habermas 1996:107). With the universalization 
principle, Habermas intends to define a procedure which can impartially justify the 
validity of norms in such a way that only generalizable interests and shared values 
can be legitimately accepted, thereby uniting the individual and collective interests. 
The principle excludes a monological and teleological interpretation of norms by 
demanding the unforced consensus by all affected.  
     The derivation of the universalization principle as the principle of moral 
argumentation presupposes a number of formal-pragmatic idealizations. The 
interconnection between discourse ethics, the principle of discourse ethics, the 
universalization principle, and rational discourse, is formulated by Habermas as: 
 
“But once it has been shown that (U) can be grounded upon the presupposi-
tions of argumentation through a transcendental pragmatic derivation, 
discourse ethics itself can be formulated in terms of the principle of discourse 
ethics (D)” (Habermas 1993:93). 
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Meta-ethically these two principles relate complementarily to each other as “content” 
and “form”. The principle of discourse ethics defines a normative ethical distinction 
between valid and invalid norms. The universalization principle expresses the 
procedural possibility of applying the principle of discourse ethics to justify norms, by 
stating a rule of argumentation which is part of the logic of practical discourses 
(Habermas 1993:93). The form of the universalization principle takes the shape of a 
rule of argumentation. The content of the principle of universalization becomes 
identical to the procedures of rational discourses. The rational discourses become 
form and real discourses actually carried out become their content. Of this, the 
content of the discourse becomes the form, and the established rationally motivated 
consensus becomes the content (Habermas 1993:94). The road from the principle of 
discourse ethics to the discursively produced consensus regarding a proposition 
expressing a valid norm, is quite complicated. This is because Habermas wants to 
avoid collapsing and confusing rules, contents, and presuppositions of argumentation 
(Habermas 1993:93).  
     The justification of discourse ethics becomes dependent on the argument from 
performative contradiction. It is only by demonstrating that the alternative to 
assuming the formal-pragmatic idealizations means running into a performative 
contradiction, that Habermas can ground his own theory. The formal pragmatic 
justification consists in the idea that its’ negation contains a performative 
contradiction (Rasmussen 1996:122). The rational discourses and the procedure are 
themselves justified in terms of formal-pragmatic conditions for reaching an authentic 
unforced consensus. As Habermas says: Every argumentation, regardless of the 
context in which it occurs, rests on pragmatic presuppositions from whose 
propositional content the principle of universalism (U) can be derived” (Habermas 
1993:82). These formal-pragmatic conditions are specified in terms of a number of 
idealizations.  
 
“A peculiarity exhibited by these pragmatic presuppositions of consensus 
formation is that they contain strong idealizations. For example, the 
supposition that all participants in dialogue use the same linguistic 
expressions with identical meaning is unavoidable but often counterfactual. 
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The validity claims that a speaker raises for the content of his assertoric, 
normative or expressive sentences are also bound to similar idealizations; 
what the speaker, here and now in a given context, asserts as valid 
transcends, according to the sense of his claim, all context-dependent, merely 
local standards of validity” (Habermas 1998:46-47). 
 
What Habermas means by counterfactual differs from Samuel Kripke’s analysis of 
counterfactual conditionals. Habermas is reversing the counterfactual conditionals so 
that they become a kind of negative argument. The form Habermas gives the 
argument is, if A is not the case, then B could by necessity not be the case. An 
example could be – if there is no oxygen on earth, then mankind could necessarily 
not breathe. The strength of the argument is the causal connection between oxygen 
and breathing (Stalnaker 1984:147-149). The form of argument justifying the formal 
pragmatic idealizations is of the type, “if the formation of consensus is not free of 
domination from external powers, then the consensus is necessarily not free and 
rationally motivating to the participants”.  
     The formal-pragmatic idealizations can be divided into three classes (Bordum 
2001:257-258). (1) There are formal demands regarding the use of language. (2) 
There are formal-pragmatic demands as to how to conduct the discourse. (3) There 
are formal-pragmatic demands to the participants in the discourse.  
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Formal-Pragmatic Demands Regarding the Use of Language 
 
 
Formal Demands: 
 
• A proposition is articulated 
• The proposition is understandable 
• Free from semantic contradiction 
• Free from performative contradiction 
• The subject-concept of a sentence is used by all consistently and with identical 
meaning 
• The predicate of a sentence is used by all consistently and with identical 
meaning 
• Universal predication must apply to all members of the class predicated (no 
indirect contradiction) 
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Formal-Pragmatic Demands to Conducting the Discourse 
 
 
Symmetry- and Accessibility Relations: 
 
• Public accessibility and an equal right to participate in the discourse 
• The equal right to raise validity-claims (regarding truth, rightness, and 
truthfulness) 
• The equal right to problematize and criticize the contested claims. 
• Freedom to take a yes-no position on a claim 
• No-one has privileged right to interrupt or stop the discourse (stops if consensus 
is achieved) 
• Consensus must be generated internally within the discourse 
• The discourse must be free of internal and external empirical force (excludes 
power) 
 
Suspensions: 
 
• Suspension of the pressure of time (deadlines) 
• Suspension of pressure to act (implementation stress) 
• Suspension of the pressure of reality as it is (hypothetical arguments are 
allowed) 
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Formal-Pragmatic Demands to the Participants in a Discourse 
 
 
Taking a Rational Attitude: 
 
• The parties involved sincerely attempt to communicate, e.g. coordinate individual 
action plans 
• All parties express themselves sincerely and truthfully (excludes manipulation) 
• All parties are accountable and can assume an obligation to the consensus 
reached 
• All are oriented towards understanding each other and reaching an 
understanding 
• All are oriented towards validity-claims  
• All justify critique, contributions, and shift of themes 
• All argue post-conventionally, principled and reflexively 
• Willingness to leave the perspective of the individual at least hypothetically 
• Willingness to justify a moral viewpoint deontologically 
• Willingness to learn from the better argument 
• Acceptance of the unforced force of the better argument 
• Recognition of justified validity as context-transcending 
• Recognition of the demand for symmetry in terms of mutuality, respect, equality, 
tolerance 
• Knowledge of the expected consequences of a proposition and taking this into 
account (pragmatic truth) 
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The idealizations themselves are justified as the only way of avoiding performative 
contradiction (Habermas 1993:76-109). At this point Habermas ends up with a 
construction which is justified by the negation of performative contradiction. This is 
where I see the affinity between my argumentation for the positive self-reference and 
Habermas’ justification of discourse ethics.  
     Habermas makes methodological use of the performative self-contradiction as an 
argument against every form of moral skepticism. "The demonstration of performative 
contradiction in particular cases serves to refute skeptical counter-arguments" 
(Habermas 1993:162). The performative contradiction as an argument also applies to 
non-cognitivists who do not believe that moral questions can be determined 
conclusively on cognitive grounds. Being a moral cognitivist, Habermas believes that 
moral questions can be determined rationally and can be justified by arguments. To 
impose a 'prohibition' against performative contradictions is equivalent to establishing 
a transcendental form of cognitivism, if non-cognitivism can be shown to always run 
into a performative self-contradiction. This seems to be the case because the idea of 
a norm implies the consent of all cognitive beings. Basically everyone who expresses 
a generalized behavioral expectation and contradicts this by excluding themselves, 
commits a performative contradiction. When Habermas suggests the discourse as a 
procedure the critic may stay silent or participate. If participation is chosen it is an 
implicit acceptance, which would be contradicted if denied explicitly.  
     The figure of the self-reference does have a central position in discourse ethics. 
This can be demonstrated by a linguistic comparison of newer texts with older texts 
of Habermas, whereby it will emerge that several concepts begin with the prefix "self-
". Some of the concepts Habermas use are self-referential. Self-legislation in the 
Kantian sense, and in a deliberative democracy is self-referential. Public communi-
cation in discourses is self-organizing. Ordinary language is self-referential. The 
illocutionary force is self-imposed. The explicative discourse is self-correcting with 
regard to meaning. First person singular expressions establish a self-reference to the 
speaker’s subjective world to which the speaker has privileged access. Rationally 
motivated consensus can reproduce itself if necessary. Niklas Luhmann has an eye 
for the central role self-reference plays in discourse ethics and writes: 
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"Even Jürgen Habermas' brilliant and keen exposure of the paradoxical self-
enlightenment of the subject depends on the externalization of the self-
reference. Habermas presents the paradigm of communicative 
intersubjectivity as a regulative ideal implied in communication itself" 
(Luhmann 1990:137).  
 
The Luhmann scholar Eva Knodt said on the topic: “The trouble is that once the 
systemic operations of discourse is identified with rationality itself, it becomes virtually 
impossible to formulate a critique of the former that would not be self-refuting” (Knodt 
1994:78). She furthermore criticizes the theory for being self-validating through the 
recursive operations of a self-validating discursive praxis that supplies it’s own 
foundation (Knodt 1994: 82). The power argument against Habermas is that circular 
reasoning is invalid (Knodt 1994:84).  
     What Luhmann and his scholars intended to show with their critique of discourse 
ethics being self-referential was that it was that discourse ethics as all self-references 
entails contradiction. But they did not take the positive self-reference and it’s self-
validating properties into account, and the fact that their premise for judging self-
reference as invalid in general is itself invalid.  
     The long line of justification of discourse ethics depends on it’s formal-pragmatic 
justification, which depends entirely on the arguments from performative 
contradiction. Habermas is clear on this when he says:  
 
“Discourse ethics uses transcendental arguments to demonstrate that certain 
conditions are unavoidable. Such arguments are geared to convincing an 
opponent that he makes performative use of something he expressively 
denies and thus gets caught up in a performative contradiction. In grounding 
(U) I am specifically concerned to identify the pragmatic presuppositions 
indispensable to any argumentation. Anyone who participates in 
argumentation has already accepted these substantive normative conditions – 
there is no alternative to them. Simply by choosing to engage in 
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argumentation, participants are forced to acknowledge this fact” (Habermas 
1993:129-130). 
 
In discourses, we encounter communication about communication, beliefs about 
beliefs, reflections on reflections, and justification of justification, in other words, 
procedurally constructed circles involving self-reference. If we were to follow the rule 
of banning all constructs involving self-reference, we would exclude the possibility of 
conducting any rational discourses. Since discourses are the medium all sciences 
use, the ban seems problematic, and the need to rationally deconstruct it accordingly 
urgent. Discourse ethics’ inherent prohibition against performative self-contradiction 
can be interpreted as a demand for self-inclusion regarding claims to universal 
norms, which underpins the interpretation that discourse ethics can be justified 
further with the theory of positive self-reference. Discourse ethics has an inherent 
positive self-reference in the concept of rationally motivated consensus.  If the 
affected reach a rationally motivated consensus, this consensus is either 
procedurally self-confirming or ceases to be consensus. Irrespective of how many 
times rationally motivating consensus becomes consensually re-confirmed or re-
affirmed, this does not change the content, that is, the consensus reached. I believe 
that the positive self-reference plays a silent but central role in the justification of 
discourse ethics. Habermas claims that his theory is self-referentially consistent, i.e., 
able to account for itself without contradiction. I agree, more than ever. The centrality 
of the prohibition against performative self-reference and the use of the indirect 
justification of discourse ethics itself is interesting, because if the performative 
contradiction is inverted logically, it claims the same as the positive self-reference. If I 
am correct, my theory of positive self-reference can be used to justify the 
constructions Habermas develops to justify discourse ethics, just taking the argument 
one step further.  
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